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The article is concerned with the interaction between fully and boundedly rational agents in
situations where their interests are perfectly aligned. The cognitive limitations of the boundedly
rational agent do not allow him to fully understand the market conditions and lead him to take non-
optimal decisions in some situations. Using categorization to model bounded rationality, we show
that the fully rational agent can manipulate information to help decreasing the expected loss caused
by the boundedly rational agent. Assuming dierent types for the boundedly rational agent, who
dier only in the categories used, we show that the fully rational agent may learn the type of the
boundedly rational agent along their interaction. Using this additional information, the outcome can
be improved and the amount of manipulated information can be decreased. Furthermore, as the
length of the interaction gets longer the probability that the fully rational agent learns the type of
the boundedly rational agent increases.
Keywords: bounded rationality, categorization, learning.
JEL Classication Numbers: C0, C70, D83.
11 Introduction
In economic literature, one of the most commonly used assumptions about decision makers
is full rationality. When faced with an economic decision problem, a fully rational decision
maker has the ability to see and understand what is feasible and what is preferable. Further-
more, he is also able to calculate the optimal course of action given these two constraints.
This widely used assumption that simplies economic models has received many criticisms
for overlooking real life situations by ignoring cognitive limitations. Wide literature initiated
by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and their collaborators provides us with experimen-
tal evidence that human beings depart systematically from full rationality due to cognitive
limitations. These limitations aect their ability to recognize the available information on
markets and their ability to compute. Herbert Simon, the originator of the phrase, denes
bounded rationality as "rational choice that takes into account the cognitive limitations of
the decision-maker-limitations of both knowledge and computational capacity" (Simon 1987).
Boundedly rational agents try to simplify and structure the economic decision process.
One of the possible ways to do this is to use categories. The usage of categories is also
supported by psychological evidence that people in environments with abundance of infor-
mation show the tendency to group events, objects or numbers into categories depending on
their perceived similarities (Rosch and Mervis 1975). The social psychologist Gordon Allport
states that "the human mind must think with the aid of categories. We cannot possibly
avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it"(Allport 1954, pg 20). Both in economic
and social psychological literature, there are many studies aiming to explain human behavior
using categorization (e.g. see Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000 or Fryer and Jackson 2008).
The following example illustrates one possible way how the categorization process works.
Consider a consumer who wants to buy a new television. There are an overwhelming number
of available alternatives on the market. In order to make a decision, the consumer has to
compare a long list of attributes among all products. These attributes include a wide variety
of technical features (e.g. screen size, aspect ratio, resolution, contrast ratio, sound system,
dimension, weight, etc.), price arrangements (price of the product, payment schedule, service
fees), brand, warranty, product support, delivery service, etc. Unless the consumer is an
expert on televisions, he may have diculties in making decision because of this long list of
items to consider for each product on the market. What happens most of the time is that after
eliminating the obviously undesirable products (e.g. too expensive products), the consumer
categorizes all the remaining products on the market so that in each category there are
products with some similar attributes. One possible categorization process works as follows.
At each step of the process, the consumer chooses an attribute, attaches some criteria to
the attribute and partitions the set of products based on the criteria. Say, for example, he
considers the screen size attribute and the criteria he attaches is if it is less than 45 inches
or between 45 and 55 inches or larger than 55 inches. In this way, he partitions the products
into three sets as "products with screen sizes less than 45 inches", "products with screen
sizes between 45 and 55 inches" and "products with screen sizes higher than 55 inches".
He continues the categorization process by choosing another attribute-criterion tuple, say
resolution and a threshold for resolution. He further renes each set in his partition based
on this new attribute-criterion tuple and obtains a new partition. In particular, he divides
2each of the three sets into two as high-resolution and low-resolution, and ends up with 6 sets
(categories) in his new partition (low resolution-small size, high resolution-small size, low
resolution-medium size, high resolution-medium size, low resolution-big size, high resolution-
big size). Repeating this process for a number of steps, he ends up with a nal partition of
products.1 Each category in this partition includes a subset of products on the market having
similar features. He chooses one product from each category as a representative and compares
all the representatives. Then he considers only the category whose representative gives the
maximum utility. The nal decision is made among the products in that category. This
process may lead to a non-optimal decision since the consumer considers only a small subset
of products (the category whose representative gives him the highest utility) rather than the
whole set. Furthermore, another feature of categorization is that even if their preferences
are perfectly aligned, the decisions made by dierent individuals may not be the same. The
reason is that the nal partition for a consumer is most likely to be dierent than the nal
partition of another consumer, since it depends on the number of steps and the criteria the
individuals use.
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the interaction between fully and boundedly
rational people. More specically, we focus on situations in which both agents work together
in a team and the boundedly rational agent has to make a decision after receiving a message
from the fully rational agent. In such setups, although being fully rational, an agent might
suer from possible non-optimal decisions made by boundedly rational agent. We investigate
how a fully rational agent can decrease the expected loss due to bounded rationality. We
show that this is possible by manipulating information sent to the boundedly rational agent.
Furthermore, we focus on what the fully rational agent can infer about the categories used by
boundedly rational agent among their interaction and we show that it is possible to decrease
the amount of manipulated information.
The following setting about a fully rational boss and his boundedly rational namesake
can be considered as a motivating example for our model. The boss, who can be regarded as
the principal, is willing to buy arms for hunting animals. Having a criminal record, he does
not meet the conditions for registration of arms with the police forces. Therefore he asks his
namesake, who does not have any records of criminal commitment, to buy a weapon for him.
The namesake, who can be regarded as the agent, has also some connections in the weaponry
black market. Therefore he can buy the weapon from either the legal or illegal market. At
this point, it is important to note that the problem we are dealing with is not a principal-
agent problem, but an instance of team theory initiated by Roy Radner. In principal-agent
problems there is a conict of interest giving rise to agency cost. In our setting, however,
this is not the case since the preferences of the boss and his namesake are perfectly aligned.
Our paper takes as a departure point Dow (1991), where an economic decision problem for
a boundedly rational agent visiting two stores and searching for the lowest price is modeled.
The bounded rationality of the agent comes from his limitations in memory. More specically,
when the agent is in the second store, he cannot remember the exact price in the rst store,
1The number of steps depends on the degree of the individual's bounded rationality. In the limit case
(when the individual is fully rational, say, an expert on televisions), the number of steps is suciently large
that each category contains only one product (nest partition).
3but only remembers to which category it belongs. The agent makes a decision by comparing
the price in the second store with the representative of the category to which the price in
the rst store belongs. Dow (1991) characterizes the optimal categorization. We depart from
Dow's setting by introducing a fully rational agent and examining the interaction between
the two agents.
Considering a similar setting to Dow's (1991), Chen, Iyer and Pazgal (2005) and Luppi
(2006) examine the price competitions in the market and show that fully rational rms can
take advantage of boundedly rational consumers. Chen, Iyer and Pazgal (2005) depart from
Dow's setting by introducing two dierent types of consumers: totally uninformed consumers,
who only consider buying from a specic store as long as the price is below their reservation
value, and informed consumers with perfect memory, i.e., fully rational consumers. They
characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game in which rms choose pricing strategies and
consumers with limited memory choose their categories. It is shown that having bounded
rational agents in the market softens price competition. A similar setting is used by Luppi
(2006), where there are rational rms on one side and boundedly rational consumers on the
other side of the market. Consumers categorize the price space and make their decision based
on their categories. She demonstrates that in the presence of boundedly rational consumers
two rms competing a la Bertrand depart from the standard equilibrium and make positive
prots. The dierence between these two papers and ours comes basically from the dierence
in the settings. In our case fully rational and boundedly rational agents are working as a
team and their common aim is to improve the outcome. In other words, the fully rational
agent is not trying to take advantage of the boundedly rational agent like in Chen, Iyer and
Pazgal (2005) and Luppi (2006), but he is trying to learn how to deal with the latter one in
order to achieve the common goal.
Another literature strand to which this paper refers is the eld of Information Trans-
mission. Crawford and Sobel (1982) analyze costless strategic communication between a
better-informed, fully rational sender and a fully rational receiver. The sender categorizes
the support of messages and sends the category to which the realized message belongs instead
of sending the real value. This situation arises because the players' preferences are not per-
fectly aligned. The receiver, after reading the signal, takes an action that aects both his and
the sender's payos. They show that as the preferences become more aligned, the number
of categories the sender uses increases, i.e., the signal becomes more informative. The main
dierence from our model relies on dierences in assumptions: full rationality of both agents
and dierences in preferences.
Although there have been many studies in economic literature on bounded rationality,
studies on interaction between fully and boundedly rational agents are limited in number.
To our knowledge all these studies concern with how fully rational agents take advantage
of boundedly rational agents (see Rubinstein 1993, Piccione and Rubinstein 2003, Eliaz and
Spiegler 2006). The main novelty of our paper lies in our team approach. Both type of
agents work together to decrease the ineciency caused by bounded rationality since their
preferences are perfectly aligned.
Another interpretation of our model could be done by using the concept of interpreted
signals rather than bounded rationality. This concept, introduced by Hong and Page (2009),
is based on the assumption that people lter reality into a set of categories. Hong and Page
4call the predictions that agents make about the value of the variable of interest by using their
own categories as interpreted signals. They state that "... two agents' signals dier if the
agents rely on dierent predictive models. This can only occur if agents dier in how they
categorize or classify objects, events or data, if agents possess dierent data, or if agents make
dierent inferences." In our model, we can think that the interpreted signal of the boss and
his namesake may dier due to their dierent ways to categorize the real world. In this case,
the action taken by the namesake may cause a loss for the boss because the good bought by
his namesake might be less valuable for the boss than the alternative. In order to decrease
this expected loss, the boss manipulates the information he sends to his namesake. Moreover,
it might be possible to decrease the amount of manipulated information, since the boss might
infer the categorization of his namesake among their interaction.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our two-period toy model,
gives the details of learning mechanism and presents results obtained using myopic approach.
Section 3 recaptures the results using a farsighted approach and Section 4 concludes.
2 A Toy Model
We consider a two-period decision problem, in which a fully rational boss wants to buy a
product in each period. There are two markets having a huge number of alternatives for the
product. The rst market is more complex than the second one. A possible explanation for
this could be that the rst market is a legal market with many regulations and the second
market is an illegal one with less complexity. The boss can only observe the products in the
rst market but cannot perform any transaction since he does not have access to neither of
the markets. Therefore he asks his boundedly rational namesake, who has access to both
markets, to compare products in the two markets and buy from one. However, cognitive
limitations of the namesake do not allow him to fully understand the complex (rst) market.
Being aware of his limitations, he categorizes the price space for the rst market to simplify
the decision process and uses the representatives of his categories in order to compare the
prices in two markets. The objective of the boss is to minimize the expected loss due to the
cognitive limitations of his namesake.
It is common knowledge that the boss is fully and the namesake is boundedly rational.
It is also known by both parties that the bounded rationality of the namesake is due to
his limited ability in understanding the rst market. It should be noted that for simplicity
we consider only a single number (price) for a product, but in fact this is a combination of
many elements, like the type, quality, brand, and age of the product, length of the warranty,
payment arrangements and service fees. It is the multiplicity of such items that makes the
namesake unable to fully understand the rst market. However, the number of elements
that are embedded in prices of the second market is less than those of the rst market. In
case of an illegal market, for example, there are no warranties, no payment arrangements,
no service fees, etc. This is what makes the rst market more complicated than the second
market. In other words, this is the reason why the namesake is unable to fully understand the
rst market whereas he understands the second market. Being aware of his limitation, the
namesake fully trusts his boss. This is because he knows that their preferences are perfectly
5aligned and that the boss is fully rational, i.e., that the boss does not have any limitations
in understanding the market. Furthermore, the namesake is aware of the fact that the boss
may lie to him. However he knows that the reason for that is not that the boss wants to take
advantage of him but to improve the outcome. Finally, the boss knows that his namesake
fully trusts him.
In the rst period, the boss observes the price on the rst market, p1
1, and then reports
a price to his namesake, p1 (not necessarily the true observed value). Receiving the report,
the namesake understands to which category the reported price belongs. Then he compares
the representative of that category with the price on the second market, p1
2, and decides
from which market to buy. Note that he may take a non-optimal action since he uses the
representative instead of the realized price for the product in the rst market. Finally,
he informs his boss about the price on the second market. Therefore, the boss is able to
understand whether the decision was optimal or not.
At the beginning of the second period, the boss updates his beliefs about the namesake's
categories by looking at the realized prices on both markets and the action of the namesake.
Then the rst period is repeated. The notations used for the second period are as follows:
p2
1 stands for the realized price on the rst market, whereas p2
2 is the price on the second
market, and p2 is the reported price.
We assume that prices on both markets are independent and distributed uniformly be-
tween 0 and 1. There are three possible types for the namesake. All types use two categories,
namely, they all partition the price space in two. In order to do that they choose a cuto price
level. Prices lower than the cuto level belong to the rst category (low) and prices higher
than the cuto belong to the second category (high). The representative of each category
which is used to compare with the price on the second market is the median of that category.
Types dier in their choices of cuto price level. Type-1 uses 1=4 as the cuto level and the
representative price of his low category is 1=8, whereas it is 5=8 for his high category. Type-2
uses 1=2 as the cuto level, thus 1=4 and 3=4 are the representatives for his low and high
categories, respectively. Finally, type-3 who uses 3=4 as the cuto level, has 3=8 and 7=8 as
the representatives for his low and high categories, respectively. The prior belief of the boss
is that all types are equally likely.
Given the number of categories and price distribution, type-2 uses optimal categories.
The cuto that is used by type-1 is lower than what it should be. It can be thought that
type-1 believes that the mean of prices is low. On the contrary, type-3 uses a cuto higher
than the optimal. With the same logic, he can be thought as a person who believes that the
mean is high. The distances of cutos of type-1 and type-3 from the optimal level of cuto
(1=2) are the same but in reverse directions. This is to say that type-1 and type-3 behave
symmetrically.
The objective of the boss is to minimize his expected loss caused by bounded rationality.
His action is the price that he reports to the namesake. There are 4 dierent types of available
action that are given in Table 1. For example, if the boss chooses to report a price in [0;1=4],
then all the types consider their low categories, and use 1=8, 1=4, 3=8 as representative,
respectively.
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Table 1: Action Space
In this section we consider a myopic approach. That is, we assume that the boss is only
concerned with the expected loss of the current period, not with the aggregate expected loss.
A farsighted approach is considered in the following section. Table 2 shows the expected loss
for each possible combination of price realizations on the rst market (p1
1) and actions taken
by the boss. Each number in bold gives the minimum expected loss for the relevant price
realization. Given the myopic approach, the action that corresponds to each bold number is
the optimal choice of action for the boss for the relevant price realization. For example, if
the boss observes a price on the rst market that belongs to interval [0;1=8], he will report a
price that belongs to interval [0;1=4]. At this point we make another assumption about the
boss. We assume that he prefers to tell the truth whenever it is among the optimal actions.
This assumption together with the fact that [0;1=8]  [0;1=4] (truth-telling is among optimal
actions) imply that the boss reports the true value in this case. However, if p1
1 2 [1=4;3=8]
it is optimal to report p1 2 [0;1=4]. In this case, the reported price is less than its true value
(the boss under-states the price). The other case in which the boss lies is when p1
1 2 [5=8;3=4].
The reported price in this case is p1 2 [3=4;1], i.e., it is higher than its true value (the boss
over-states the price).
Observed Pricen Report p1 2 [0; 1
4] p1 2 [1
4; 1
2] p1 2 [1
2; 3
4] p1 2 [3
4;1]
p1
1 2 [0; 1
























8] 63 35 15 3
p1
1 2 [7
8;1] 93 57 29 9
Table 2: Expected Loss (common multiplier: 1
683)
















report the true price otherwise.
(1)
7Under-statement of the price occurs only if p1
1 2 [1=4;3=8] and receiving this report all types
use their low (L) categories (see Table 1). However, if p1
1 2 [1=4;3=8] and the boss reports the
true value of the price rather than under-stating, type-1 uses his high (H) category whereas
type-2 and 3 stick to their low (L) categories. So, it is only type-1 who is aected by under-
statement. Since the boss prefers to tell the truth whenever it is among the optimal actions
and under-statement does not aect other types, the boss uses this strategy only if type-1 is
among possible types when the observed price belongs to interval [1=4;3=8].
Over-statement of the price occurs only if p1
1 2 [5=8;3=4]. By the same reasoning above,
over-statement aects only type-3, not others. Therefore, the boss uses this strategy only
if type-3 is among possible types when p1
1 2 [5=8;3=4]. Otherwise, he prefers to report the
truth.
Figure (1) represents the reaction function of the boss. Here, we can observe that the
behavior of the boss is symmetric around 1=2. The arrow on the left represents under-
statement and in case of under-statement only type-1 switches category, whereas the arrow
on the right represents over-statement and only type-3 switches category in this case. As
noted earlier, these types behave symmetrically which results in symmetric behavior of the
boss.
Figure 1: Reaction Function
At the end of the rst period, the boss updates his beliefs by looking at the prices realized
in both markets and the action taken by the namesake. To see how this works let us consider
the following example. Say, p1
1 2 [0;1=8], p1
2 2 [1=8;1=4]. Given the price on the rst market,
the boss reports the true value (see (1)). In this case, the representative price is 1=8 for
type-1, 1=4 for type-2 and 3=8 for type-3. The namesake, comparing the representative price
with the price on the second market, buys the good from the rst market if he is of type-1
and buys from the second market if he is of type-2 or type-3. If the product is bought from
the rst market, the boss understands that his namesake is of type-1 and updates his belief
such that with probability 1 the namesake is of type-1. If instead, it is bought from the
second market, the boss updates his belief such that with probability 1=2 the namesake is of
type-2 and with probability 1=2 the namesake is of type-3.
Figure 2 summarizes the learning process at the end of period-1. Numbers in bold stand
for the numbers of possible types of the namesake. The boss starts with three possible and
equally likely types. The probability that he learns the exact type, i.e., that the number for
possible types is 1, at the end of the rst period is 3
32 = 0:09375. The probability that the
number of possible types decreases to 2 (elimination of one type) is 3
16 = 0:1875, and nally
the probability that the boss learns nothing is 23
32 = 0:71875.
The boss starts the second period with updated beliefs. The objective is again to minimize
the expected loss caused by bounded rationality. When type-1 is among possible types and
8Figure 2: Learning Process, 1st Period
the observed price on the rst market in the second period (p2
1) belongs to the interval
[1=4;3=8], he uses the under-statement strategy described above. Furthermore, when type-3
is among possible types and p2
1 2 [5=8;3=4], he uses the over-statement strategy. In all the
other cases he reports the true observed value. The reaction function for the second period
coincides with the one for the rst period (1) if both type-1 and type-3 are among possible
types.
Figure 3: Learning Process, 2nd Period
Figure 3 summarizes the learning process for the whole game. If the boss gures out the
exact type of the namesake (arrives to node 1) at the end of the rst period, there is nothing
left to learn and he continues the second period with the relevant strategy. If he arrives to
node 2 at the end of the rst period, the learning process continues and he might either gure
out the type and arrive to node 1 or not learn anything and stay in node 2. If he does not
learn anything about the type at the end of the rst period (stays at node 3), there are three
possibilities for the second period. He might gure out the exact type and arrive to node
1, or he might eliminate only one possible type and arrive to node 2, or he might not learn
anything and stay at node 3. The overall probability that the boss gures out the exact type
9of the namesake by the end of the game is 0:19238, that he eliminates only one possible type
is 0:29102 and that he does not learn anything is 0:51660.
The transition matrix of the learning process is given in Table 3. It is a nite Markov
Chain and has three ergodic states. According to the Theorem by Kemeny and Snell (1976),
the probability after n steps that the process is in an ergodic state tends to 1, as n tend to
innity. This means that if the game is repeated for n periods the probability that the boss
learns the exact type of the namesake tends to 1 as n gets larger.
possible types f1,2,3g f1,2g f1,3g f2,3g f1g f2g f3g
f1,2,3g 0.71875 0.08333 0.02083 0.08333 0.04167 0.01042 0.04167
f1,2g 0 0.84375 0 0 0.07813 0.07813 0
f1,3g 0 0 0.75000 0 0.12500 0 0.12500
f2,3g 0 0 0 0.84375 0 0.07813 0.07813
f1g 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
f2g 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
f3g 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 3: Transition Matrix
The relationship between the number of periods and the probability of learning the exact
type is given in Table 4. The probability increases in the number of periods, and it becomes








Table 4: Number of periods/probability
A crucial point to be noted is that in this section we use a myopic approach to solve
the optimization problem. This means that we assume the boss is concerned only with the
expected loss of the period he is in. Whereas with a farsighted approach, he considers the
overall expected loss that is the sum of discounted expected losses. However, both approaches
yield the same results with the given available types. In this setting, a manipulated message
aects only one type, while other types stick to their category that they would consider
without the manipulated message. In other words, a strategy that needs to be used in order
to decrease the expected loss caused by one type does not conict with the strategies that
need to be used for other types. For example, the under-statement strategy is used whenever
type-1 is among possible types. The fact that type-2 and/or type-3 are among possible types
10does not change this strategy, because it induces only type-1 to change his category, not the
other types.
Therefore, the boss can continue to use the reaction function given in (1) even if he knows
the exact type of the namesake. It should be noted that if he does so, he might report a
manipulated price although reporting the true value is also among optimal actions. Even
tough this violates our assumption that the boss prefers reporting the truth whenever it is
possible, it yields the same expected loss for the boss. This fact ensures that he can use
the same reaction function for each period no matter if he is farsighted or myopic. In the
following section we show that myopic and farsighted optimizations do not always coincide.
3 Farsighted Approach
In this section, we consider a farsighted approach. That is, we assume that the objective
of the boss is to minimize the sum of discounted expected losses. We modify the model by
changing the possible types. Here, we assume that the namesake has two possible types. The
rst type uses two categories (low and high) and his cuto price level is 1=3. Therefore he
uses 1=6 as the representative for low category (L) and 2=3 for high category (H). The second
type uses three categories (low, medium and high) and his cuto price levels are 1=3 and 2=3.
Thus 1=6, 1=2 and 5=6 are the representative prices for his low (L), medium (M), and high
(H) categories, respectively. The prior belief of the boss is that both types are equally likely.
In this setting, the boss can choose his strategy among three dierent types of action,
that are represented in Table 5. If he reports a price belonging to [0;1=3], both types use
low categories and 1=6 as representative price. If he reports pi 2 [1=3;2=3], then type-1 uses
his high category and 2=3 as his representative for the rst market price, and type-2 uses his
medium category and 1=2 as the representative (i 2 f1;2g represents the period). Finally, if
the boss reports pi 2 [2=3;1], both types will use high categories and type-1 uses 2=3 whereas
type-2 uses 5=6 as representative price.
type-1 type-2 used prices
pi 2 [0; 1









3;1] H H f 2
3; 5
6 g
Table 5: Action Space
We solve the optimization problem by backward induction since we are considering a
farsighted approach. If the boss does not learn anything about the type of his namesake
during the rst period, he starts second period with the belief that both types are equally
likely. Following the same reasoning of the previous section, we get the following reaction
function:
R(p2
1j type1 & type2) =






report the true price otherwise,
(2)
11where R(p2
1j type1 & type2) stands for the reaction function for the second period given that
both type-1 and type-2 are among possible types. And the expected loss in this case is




where E2(L) denoted the expected loss in the second period. If the boss learns that his









report the true price otherwise.
(4)





If the boss learns that his namesake is of type-2 during the rst period, his reaction function
for the second period is to always report the true value, since given the number of categories






Now, we move to the rst period. If the boss, after observing the price on the rst market,
reports p1 2 [0;1=3] then both types will use low category and 1=6 as representative price
for the rst market (see Table 5). Since both types will be using the same representative,
they will behave in the same way. Therefore, it will be impossible for the boss to distinguish
between the two, i.e., the boss will not learn anything about the type of his namesake and
will continue with his initial belief. In this case, the overall expected loss will be the sum of
the expected loss from the rst period and the expected loss of the second period multiplied







2 +  E2(Lj type1 & type2): (7)
If the boss reports p1 2 [1=3;2=3] then type-1 will use his high category and 2=3 as repre-
sentative price for the rst market, whereas type-2 will use his medium category and 1=2 as
representative (see Table 5). If the price realization on the second market is below 1=2 then
both types will act in the same way and will buy from second market. If it is greater than
2=3 both types will act again in the same way and will buy from the rst market. However,
if p1
2 2 [1=2;2=3], type-1 will buy from the second whereas type-2 will buy from the rst mar-
ket. Thus, the boss will learn the exact type of his namesake only if p1
2 2 [1=2;2=3] and this
occurs with probability 1=6. Hence, with this strategy the probability that he boss gures
12out that his namesake is of type-1 is 1
6  1
2 = 1
12, which is the same for type-2. In this case,






























If the boss reports p1 2 [2=3;1] then type-1 will use his high category and 2=3 as represen-
tative price for the rst market, whereas type-2 will also use his high category and 5=6 as
representative (see Table 5). In this case, both types will act in the same way unless the price
realization on the second market belongs to [2=3;5=6]. Thus, the boss will learn the exact
type of his namesake only if p1
2 2 [2=3;5=6] and this occurs with probability 1=6. Hence, the




































report p1 2 [0; 1
3] if p1
1 2 [0;a];
report p1 2 [1
3; 2
3] if p1
1 2 [a; 2
3];





where a = 2760 
7200 :
Taking into account the assumption that the boss prefers to tell the truth whenever it is








report the true price otherwise.
(11)
The reaction function (11) shows that the optimal strategy depends on the discount factor
of the boss. If the boss concentrates only on the expected loss of the current period and
does not take into account future expected losses, i.e., if  = 0, then myopic and farsighted
optimization results coincide. Whenever the boss considers current losses together with future
losses (i.e., whenever  6= 0), there is a dierence, albeit small, between the reaction functions
resulted from myopic and farsighted approach.
Here we consider a game with only two periods. Before the last, there is only one period
in which the boss can learn something about the type of his namesake. Furthermore, he has
only one period, namely the second period, where he can use this information. This is the
reason why the dierence between reaction functions resulting from myopic and farsighted
optimizations is so small. This dierence is increasing in the number of periods of the game
as well as in . A boss with high  is more concerned about future loss compared to a boss
with lower . Therefore he is more willing to invest in learning the type of his namesake in
order to decrease his future loss.
134 Conclusion
We have constructed a model in order to study the interaction between fully and boundedly
rational agents when they are parts of the same team and have perfectly aligned preferences.
In an environment with abundance of information (type, quality, brand, age of the good,
length of the warranty, payment arrangements and service fees), boundedly rational agents
are having diculties in making decision due to their cognitive limitations. In order to
simplify the situation, they try to group events, objects or numbers into categories. In our
model we consider a boundedly rational agent who partitions the price space into connected
sets. The decision made by this agent might be non-optimal in some cases, since he is using
categories instead of realized prices and regards prices belonging to the same category as
equal.
Assuming dierent types for the boundedly rational agent and that types dier only in
categories they use, we show that during his interaction, the fully rational agent may learn
about the type of the boundedly rational agent, and using this additional information, he can
improve the outcome. The probability that he learns the type of the boundedly rational agent
increases in the length of this interaction, whereas it decreases in the number of available
types.
Finally, we show that myopic and farsighted approaches yield dierent results in some
cases, depending on the available types. This dierence is caused by the tradeo between
experimenting for the future and starting to cope with the problem right away.
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